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Abstract—The recent emergence of the small cloud (SC),
both in concept and in practice, has been driven mainly by
issues related to service cost and complexity of commercial
cloud providers (e.g., Amazon) employing massive data centers.
However, the resource inelasticity problem faced by the SCs
due to their relatively scarce resources (e.g., virtual machines)
might lead to a potential degradation of customer QoS and loss
of revenue. A proposed solution to this problem recommends
the sharing of resources between competing SCs to alleviate the
resource inelasticity issues that might arise [1]. Based on this idea,
a recent effort ( [2]) proposed SC-Share, a performance-driven
static market model for competitive small cloud environments
that results in an efficient market equilibrium jointly optimizing
customer QoS satisfaction and SC revenue generation. However,
an important non-obvious question still remains to be answered,
without which SC sharing markets may not be guaranteed to
sustain in the long-run - is it still possible to achieve a stable
market efficient state when the supply of SC resources is dynamic
in nature and there is a variation of customer demand over time?.
In this paper, we address the problem of efficient market design
for SC resource sharing in dynamic environments. We answer
our previous question in the affirmative through the use of Arrow
and Hurwicz’s disequilibrium process [3], [4] in economics, and
the gradient play technique in game theory that allows us to
iteratively converge upon efficient and stable market equilibria.
Index Terms—small cloud; dynamic market; stability
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is becoming increasingly popular and
pervasive in the information technology (IT) marketplace due
to its on-demand resource provisioning, high availability, and
elasticity. These features allow cloud end users (e.g., individ-
uals, small-scale companies, world-wide enterprises) to access
resources in a pay-as-you-go manner and to meet varying de-
mands sans upfront resource commitments [5]. Cloud service
providers (Amazon AWS [6], Google Compute Engine [7],
and Microsoft Azure [8]) allow customers to quickly deploy
their services without a large initial infrastructure investment.
A. The Rise of Small-Scale Data Centers
There are some non-trivial concerns in obtaining service
from large-scale public clouds, including cost and complexity.
Massive cloud environments can be costly and inefficient for
some customers (e.g., Blippex [9]), thus resulting in more and
more customers building their own smaller data centers [10]
for better control of resource usage; for example, it is hard
to guarantee network performance in large-scale public clouds
due to their multi-tenant environments [11]. Moreover, smaller
data center providers exhibit greater flexibility in customizing
services for their users, while large-scale public providers
minimize their management overhead by simplifying their
services; e.g., Linode [12] distinguishes itself by providing
clients with easier and more flexible service customization.
The use of small-scale clouds (SCs) is one approach to solve
cost and complexity issues.
Despite the potential emergence of small-scale clouds, the
latter due to their moderate sizes, are likely to suffer from
resource under-provisioning, thus failing to meet peak demand
at times. This leads to a resource provisioning dilemma where
the SCs have to make the tradeoff between request loss and
the cost of over-provisioning. One way out of this dilemma
is for such small clouds to cooperate with each other to help
meet each others’ user demand via resource sharing at low
costs, thereby increasing their individual resources when in
need without having to significantly invest in more. Such
cooperation is analogous to Business Clusters described in
mainstream economics which emerge due to, among other
factors, shared interests and geographical proximity [13].
B. Research Motivation
In this section, we briefly describe the problem setting
followed by the challenges that motivate us to alleviate them.
Problem Setting. The effective sharing or borrowing re-
sources by an SC from its peers involves mutually satisfying
the interests of the stakeholders in context. In this paper, we
consider three different stakeholders: (i) the SC customers,
(ii) profit maximizing autonomous SCs, and (iii) a regu-
latory agency overseeing certain functioning aspects of the
autonomous SCs (e.g., ensuring customer data privacy). The
SC customers are interested in achieving certain performance
measures for their jobs (e.g., low job response time, cheap stor-
age); the SCs are interested in maximizing revenues obtained
from serving customers; and a regulatory agency (e.g., the
local government, a federated agency [14] [15]) is interested
in (i) ensuring a proper manner by which the autonomous SCs
conduct their business of lending resources to peer SCs (e.g.,
preserving data privacy, designing policies for (a) customer
cost effectiveness by disallowing SCs to charge high customer
prices, and (b) maintaining a certain level SC and customer
welfare), and (ii) recommending resource exchanges between
autonomous SCs in a way (without interfering in the important
resource (allocation, scheduling) decisions of the SCs) that
encompasses the necessary means for the proper configuration
of the resources (e.g., using the OpenNebula manager and its
external resource lease manager Haizea [16]). We term the
above setting as an SC market.
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The Challenges. Ideally, an SC would want to service
all its customers solely using its own resources. However,
the primary barrier to this goal is its individual resource
capacity which might not be enough to service peak customer
demand. In such a case, the SC can either resort to peer
SCs for additional resources, thereby incurring borrowing
costs, and/or buy the services of a big public cloud (e.g.,
Amazon). The latter option is generally more expensive than
the former and also likely to be more privacy threatening.
Thus, from an SC’s viewpoint, its challenge is to satisfy two
conflicting objectives: (i) to generate as much revenue by
serving its customer demands, and (ii) to incur as low as
possible, borrowing and/or buying costs from other clouds. For
simplicity purposes, we assume that buying resources from big
clouds (e.g., Google, Amazon) is the last resort for an SC in
events of low resource availability, and in such events it would
try its best to get resources from peer SCs. Another challenge
is to ensure that at market equilibrium (see below), the SCs
and their customers ideally operate on parameters (see Section
II) that allow the market to be efficient, a condition commonly
characterized in microeconomics by certain popular functions
(see Section II.C) of market stakeholder utilities, and one that
entails optimal social welfare allocation amongst the SCs and
their customers. This is a non-trivial and challenging task as
the existence of a market equilibrium does not necessarily
imply market efficiency [17]. In this regard, the authors in
[2] show the existence of SC market equilibrium through
numerical simulations, and do not provide a general theory
for equilibrium existence. In addition to the above mentioned
challenges, the SC market is dynamic in nature due to the non-
static nature of the supply of SC resources, as well as due to
the variations in customer demand over time. This dynamic
nature of the SC market is likely to lead to frequent market
equilibrium perturbations and potentially a state of market
disequilibrium. Conditioned on the achievability of a market
efficient equilibrium, a state of eventual disequilibrium will
threaten the long-term sustainability of SC markets. Here, the
term ‘market equilibrium’ refers to a situation in which all
market stakeholders mutually satisfy their interests, in which
case an important challenge is to design a stable market that
is robust to perturbations and always returns to its equilibrium
point(s) when perturbations do occur.
Our Goal. In this paper, our goal is to formulate the joint
‘stakeholder satisfaction problem’ in dynamic SC environ-
ments as an efficient, stable, and sustainable dynamic mar-
ket/ecosystem design task, and propose an effective solution
for it.
C. Research Contributions
We make the following research contributions in this paper.
• We propose a utility theory based small cloud compet-
itive market model comprising of SC customers, profit
maximizing autonomous SCs, and a regulatory agency
overseeing some functionality aspects of the SCs, as
the market stakeholders. The model mathematically ex-
presses the stakeholder interests in terms of utility func-
tions and paves the path for analyzing SC markets for
market equilibrium properties (see Section II).
• We analyze our proposed market model via a convex
optimization framework for the existence and uniqueness
of a static market equilibrium at which (i) the utilitarian
social welfare function (see Section III for a definition
) is maximized, i.e., the market equilibrium is socially
efficient, (ii) the market equilibrium is Pareto efficient
(see Section III for a definition), (iii) the market is
cleared, i.e., the SC supply balances customer demand,
and (iv) no stakeholder has any incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium. We show that there exists a unique static
competitive market equilibrium jointly satisfying (i), (ii),
(iii), and (iv), however there are several static market
equilibria jointly satisfying (ii), (iii), and (iv). (see Section
III).
• Using notion of a disequilibrium process proposed by
Arrow and Hurwicz [3], [4], we apply the gradient play
technique in game theory [18] that is based on the theory
of differential equations, to investigate the dynamic mar-
ket setting where a static market equilibrium (conditioned
on their existence) is potentially subject to perturbations
that might lead to market disequilibrium. In this re-
gard, we show (in theory) that static market equilibrium
achieved in small cloud markets is asymptotically stable
in dynamic market settings. Our use of the gradient play
technique is motivated by the fact that in many practical
market environments stakeholders (i) find it behaviorally
difficult or computationally expensive to play their best
responses [19], (ii) have zero or incomplete knowledge
of the utilities of other stakeholders in the market, and
(iii) cannot even observe the actions of other stakeholders
in the worst case. In such environments, gradient play is
a suitable technique to achieve static market equilibrium
stability iteratively [20], from a state of disequilibrium.
More specifically, for our market setting the occurrence
of (i)-(iii) is quite likely. Gradient play also works when
issues (i)-(iii) do not arise (see Section IV).
• We validate our proposed theory through extensive nu-
merical experiments to illustrate the stability of SC
markets and the high speed with which such markets
converge to stable equilibria despite variations in market
supply-demand. Through numerical experiments, we also
investigate market equilibria performance of SC markets
with respect to three Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
functions, viz., the utilitarian function, the egalitarian
function, and the Rawl’s function, standard in the eco-
nomics literature [17]. Here, we study and compare (i) the
fairness amongst market players of a welfare allocation
achieved through a given social welfare function and (ii)
the amount of social welfare of SC markets under the
different social welfare functions, when social welfare
optimality is achieved. Via our numerical evaluation, we
infer that SC markets are sustainable. (see Section V).
II. COMPETITIVE MARKET MODEL
In this section, we propose a utility theory based small
cloud Walrasian competitive market model comprising of
profit maximizing autonomous SCs, their customers, and a
regulatory agency overseeing some functionality aspects of
the SCs. A Walrasian competitive market [17] represents a
pure exchange economy without production, where there are a
finite number of agents, i.e., SCs in our work, endowed with
a finite number of commodities, i.e., computing resources in
our work, that gets traded with SC customers and peer SCs.
The aim behind proposing the model is to pave the path for
mathematically analyzing SC markets for market equilibrium
properties, and derive their practical implications.
In this paper, we consider each SC customer to deal with
three job types, where each job comprises multiple tasks: (i)
Type I jobs that need to be serviced wholly/entirely when they
arrive (e.g., a user could invoke a regular MapReduce batch
job that defines a set of Mappers and Reducers to be executed
for the job to complete in its entirety.), (ii) Type II jobs that
can be curtailed to fewer tasks (e.g., an approximation job
like the ones cited in [21]), the curtailment decision primarily
arising from (a) the nature of VM instance prices, (b) the
unnecessity of the customer to keep executing a job beyond
a certain accuracy already achieved, and (c) the unnecessity
of the customer to keep executing the job beyond a certain
deadline, and (iii) Type III jobs where certain tasks can be
shifted over time for future processing, the remaining job
tasks requiring service as they arrive (e.g., analyzing a DNA
sequence, re-running partially/entirely a current job later when
it gets killed in a spot cloud environment due to momentary
unavailability of resources.). Next, we model the stakeholders
in the SC market.
A. Modeling the SCs
Let there be n autonomous profit maximizing SCs. Each SC
can spread over multiple locations. Customer demand for SC i
is a set of processing tasks from its customers (both end-users
and peer SCs) that require the use of virtual machines as the
primary computing resources. In this regard, we assume that
each SC i reserves (allocates) a total of vmri virtual machines
(VMs) in its data center to service demands from its customers.
We term such VMs as reserved VMs. The value of vmri
is pre-decided by SC i based on the statistics of customer
demand patterns observed over a period of time, as one of the
factors. For simplicity, we will focus on VMs representing a
single resource type in this paper. A justification is provided
in Section 4 of the Appendix [22]. In the event that vmri
machines are insufficient to satisfy consumer demands, SC
i buys/borrows vmbi VMs from peer SCs. Here, vm
b
i is the
number of borrowed VMs available to SC i from its peers. In
the event that both reserved and borrowed VMs are insufficient
to meet customer demand, SC i resorts to a public cloud for
vmpci VM instances. We assume here that a public cloud is
large enough to provide any required number of VM instances
to SCs. We do not consider communication network bandwidth
issues to be a bottleneck to customer service satisfaction in our
work.
Let c(vmri ) be the associated operating cost to SC i for
reserving vmri virtual machines to serve its customers. We
define c(vmri ) via a separable equation of the following form.
c(vmri ) = f1(vm
r
i ) + f2(vm
r
i ), (1)
where f1(·) (a linear function) and f1(·) (a non-linear func-
tion) are functions such that the marginal operating cost for
SC i is a general decreasing linear function of the number of
VM instances, i.e., the additional operating cost, dcdvmri , due
to a unit increase in the number of VMs required to service
customer demand varies in a negative linear fashion with the
number of VMs. We use this type of marginal cost functions
in our work due to their popularity in economics to model
diminishing costs/returns [17]. We approximate the number
of VMs to be a non-discrete quantity. Specifically, for the
purpose of analysis, we assume the cost function c(·) to be
concave, quadratic, and twice continuously differentiable, i.e.,
the marginal costs become decreasing linear functions of the
number of VM instances. We can define one such c(vmri )
function as follows.
c(vmri ) = α
i
rvm
r
i +
βir
2
(vmri )
2, (2)
where αir (a positive value) and β
i
r (a negative value) are
SC i’s cost coefficients for its reserved resources, i.e., virtual
machines, such that the marginal operating cost for SC i is
a negative linear function. The above quadratic form of the
cost function, apart from satisfying the property of negative
linear marginals, not only allows for tractable analysis, but
also serves as a good second-order approximation for the
broader class of concave payoffs [23]. We denote piri to be the
profit that SC i makes through its reserved VMs for servicing
customers, and define the maximum profit that SDC i can
make, via the following optimization problem.
max
vmri
piri = max
vmri
[ρivm
r
i − c(vmri )]
subject to
vmrmini ≤ vmri ≤ vmrmaxi ,
where ρi is the per-unit VM instance price charged by SC i
to its customers, and vmrmini and vm
r
maxi are the lower and
upper bounds for the number of VM instances reserved by
SC i for its customers. We assume that each SC i is small
enough not to be able to exert market power over its peer
SCs and strategically influence the prices they charge their
customers. i.e., each SC is a price taker [17]. The prices
that individual SCs charge their customers are determined by
individual SCs in price competition with one another in the
process of maximizing their own utilities and selling off their
endowment.
Let c(vmbi ) be the associated operating cost to SC i for
borrowing vmbi virtual machines from peer SCs to serve
customers, when the reserved VMs are not enough to satisfy
customer service demands. Like in the case of formulating
c(vmri ), we formulate c(vm
b
i ) in a manner such that the as-
sociated marginal operating costs for borrowing an additional
VM instance decreases in a negative linear fashion with the
number of VMs. Mathematically, we represent c(vmbi ) by the
following equation.
c(vmbi ) = α
i
bvm
b
i +
βib
2
(vmbi )
2, (3)
where αib (a positive quantity) and β
i
b ( a negative quantity)
are SC i’s coefficients for its borrowed virtual machines. We
denote by pibi the profit that SC i makes when borrowing
VMs from peer SCs for servicing customers, and define
the maximum profit that SC i can make, via the following
optimization problem.
max
vmbi
pibi = max
vmbi
[ρivm
b
i − c(vmbi )− c(vmpci )]
subject to
vmbmini ≤ vmbi ≤ vmbmaxi .
Here, (i) vmbmini and vm
b
maxi are the lower and upper bounds
for the number of VM instances borrowed by SC i for its
customers, from peer SCs, (ii) c(vmpci ) is the cost to SC i
to offload vmpci VM instances worth of customer demand to
a public cloud in the event that vmri and vm
b
i VM instances
together are not enough to service i’s total customer demand.
We mathematically represent c(vmpci ) in the same manner as
c(vmri ) and c(vm
b
i ), and express it via the following equation.
c(vmpci ) = α
i
pcvm
pc
i +
βipc
2
(vmpci )
2, (4)
where αipc (a positive quantity) and β
i
pc (a negative quantity)
are SC i’s coefficients for the resources the public cloud uses
to service i’s offloaded customer demand portions. We do not
assume any constraints on the resources available to the public
cloud for servicing offloading requests by SCs.
B. Modeling SC Customers
For a customer j who has a Type I job, we express this
customer’s utility for that job as a concave, quadratic, and
twice continuously differentiable separable function, Uj(·),
defined as follows.
Uj(vm
e
j) = α
e
jvm
e
j +
βej
2
(vmej)
2, (5)
where vmej is the amount of VM instances required to process
j’s entire job. Similar to the motivation and rationale behind
the concave, quadratic cost functions for SCs, the utility
function of an SC customer is designed such that the marginal
utility for the customer is a decreasing linear function of the
number of VM instances, i.e., the additional utility increase
due to a unit increase in the number of VMs varies in a
negative linear fashion with the number of VMs. αej (a positive
quantity) and βej (a negative quantity) in the above equation
are j’s utility coefficients.
Like in the case of a customer with a Type I job, for a
customer j who has a Type II job, we express his utility for that
job as a quadratic twice continuously differentiable function,
Uj(·), defined as follows.
Uj(vm
c
j) = α
e
jvm
c
j +
βej
2
(vmcj)
2, (6)
where vmcj is the amount of VM instances required to process
j’s curtailed job, and is expressed as
vmcj = κ
1
jvm
e
j + κ
2
jvm
e
j , κ
1
j , κ
2
j ∈ (0, 1).
Here, αej (a positive value) and β
e
j (a negative value) are
j’s utility coefficients for Type I jobs. The interpretation of
vmcj is as follows: κ
1
jvm
e
j is the number of VMs required to
accomplish j’s curtailed task, whereas κ2jvm
e
j is the additional
number of unused VMs that contribute to j’s extra utility when
its job is curtailed, and provides it with an overall perceived
satisfaction greater than that obtained from the utility derived
solely using κ1jvm
e
j used VMs for the curtailed job.
For a customer j who has a Type III job, similar to the case
of Type I and Type II jobs, we express his utility for those
tasks as a quadratic twice continuously differentiable function,
Uj(·), defined as follows.
Uj(vm
s
j) = α
s
jvm
s
j +
βsj
2
(vmsj)
2, (7)
where vmsj is the amount of VM instances required to process
j’s time-shiftable tasks, and αsj ( a positive value) and β
s
j (a
negative value) are j’s utility coefficients for time-shiftable
jobs.
A customer j can have jobs of all three types. Thus, his
aggregate tasks are worth vmagj = vm
e
j + vm
c
j + vm
s
j VM
instances. Therefore, customer j’s aggregate utility takes a
similar form to his utility for a specific job type, and is given
by
Uj(vm
ag
j ) = α
ag
j vm
ag
j +
βagj
2
(vmagj )
2, (8)
where αagj (a positive quantity) and β
ag
j (a negative quantity)
are j’s utility coefficients for his job aggregate.
We denote pitypej to be the net utility that customer j
generates through getting service for a given job type =
{e, c, s} from its contracted SC, and define the maximum
net utility that customer j can generate, via the following
optimization problem.
max
vmtypej
pitypej = max
vmtypej
[Uj(vm
type
j )− ρjvmtypej ]
subject to
vmmintypej
≤ vmtypej ≤ vmmaxtypej .
Here, vmmintypej and vmmaxtypej are the lower and upper
bounds for the number of VM instances used up by customer
j’s job type (be it whole, curtailed, shifted, or aggregate). ρj
is the price paid by customer j to his chosen SC per VM
instance used for his job.
C. Modeling the Regulator
The role of the regulator (e.g., the government, a federated
agency) as applicable to our work is to ensure (i) good privacy
practices between SC, (ii) the design of policies/mechanisms
that enable autonomous SCs to price customers appropriately
without making excessive profits through market exploitation,
and (iii) an optimum level of social welfare allocation amongst
the autonomous SCs at market equilibrium. (i) is specific
to our problem setting and is one of the most important
motivation for the presence of a regulator (see Section I) in
the first place1. However, the presence of a regulator brings in
1In practice, using mechanism design theory, the regulator can devise
efficient economic mechanisms that enable SCs to find it incentive compatible
in protecting the privacy of their customers. However, we do not focus on the
design of such mechanisms in this paper.
other important benefits through (ii) and (iii). (ii) is necessary
to prevent any SC from exploiting its customers on service
costs. In this work we do not focus on the design of such
mechanisms, and assume the existence of one2, whereas (iii) is
important from an economic perspective as maximizing social
welfare is a key objective in welfare economics because it
leads to (a) a certain level of equitability of allocations (in
resources or in net utility) amongst the stakeholders, (b) might
guarantee Pareto efficiency at market equilibrium [17], and
(c) an optimal social welfare state denotes the best possible
operating point of an economic system. A Pareto efficient
allocation of utilties amongst a set of stakeholders ensures that
at market equilibrium none of the stakeholders can increase
their net utility without decreasing any other stakeholder’s net
utility. The notion of equitability is important in the context
of autonomous SC markets because they often operate in a
decentralized fashion, and ideally, we would want a social
welfare allocation at market equilibrium that does not result
in considerable disparity amongst the players’ allocations
(despite being Pareto efficient).
In this paper, we define the social welfare function of the
regulator to be the sum of the net utilities of the SCs and their
customers at market equilibrium. We denote this function by
SW, and express it as
SW =
∑
j∈C
Uj(vm
ag
j )−
∑
i∈SC
(
c(vmri ) + c(vm
b
i ) + c(vm
pc
i )
)
,
(9)
where C is the set of consumers, SC is the set of small clouds,
the first term is the sum of the utility of the consumers, and
the second term is the sum of the costs faced by the SCs
in SC for servicing customer demands. The aforementioned
social welfare expression is the standard Bergson-Samuelson
utilitarian social welfare function in economics [17] whose
optimality does not focus on equality of resource or utility
allocations amongst each class of stakeholders, i.e., the SCs
and the customers, but only on Pareto efficiency of resource
allocations amongst the stakeholders, and equality of marginal
utility allocations amongst the stakeholders. Note that due to
our autonomous SC setting, the regulator in practice might not
have enough say in welfare maximizing resource allocation,
and can only expect to have the social welfare function
maximized in the best case because it cannot directly enforce
optimal strategy choices on the SCs like in a centralized
control setting. The important question here is whether the
utilitarian social welfare function is indeed the most appro-
priate choice for this work.
We choose to work with the utilitarian function over two
other popular Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions
used in economic applications: the egalitarian function, and
the Rawl’s function, for the following reasons:
• The parameters corresponding to the unique optimal so-
lution of the maximum utilitarian social welfare problem
coincides with those obtained at the unique equilibrium
of a purely distributed market comprising autonomous
2Economists Laffont and Tirole have proposed principal-agent models in
this regard [24] which will enable autonomous SCs to charge appropriate
prices to customers purely out of self-interest.
SC’s without the presence of a regulator, and are Pareto
optimal. This result is due to Arrow-Debreu’s first and
second fundamental theorems of welfare economics [17].
In addition, at market equilibrium, there is equitability
in the marginal utilities of all the autonomous SCs (in
case of SCs, the utility is represented by cost and is thus
a negative utility) and their customers. The parameter
coincidence property does not necessarily hold for non-
utilitarian social welfare functions.
• The Rawl’s social welfare function focusses on maxi-
mizing the minimum resource/utility allocation to any
stakeholder (e.g., SC) within the class of market stake-
holders. A major drawback of adopting this social welfare
function is that it will in general discourage SCs from
sharing their resources (even at Pareto optimal system
settings) with other SCs (consequently affecting customer
QoS satisfaction), thereby challenging the core philoso-
phy behind an SC market, and will not likely be popular
with either the SCs or the regulator. A maximin utility
allocation among SCs would favor, for example, a regime
that reduces every SC to complete “misery” if it promotes
the well-being of the most “miserable” SC by even a very
small amount.
• The egalitarian social welfare function focusses on equal-
izing the utilities of all market stakeholders in the ab-
solute sense. Similar to the case of Rawl’s function, it
suffers from the major drawback that it will in general
discourage SCs from sharing their resources (even at
Pareto optimal system settings) with other SCs. Likewise,
it is unlikely to be popular amongst either the regulator
or autonomous SCs. For example, if we had to choose
between two allocation policies, one under which all SCs
would have a cardinal utility of 100, but one SC would
have a utility of 99; the second policy under which every
SC is “miserable” and will have a cardinal utility of
1 unit. The egalitarian regulator would prefer the latter
because under this option, every SC has exactly the same
utility level.
III. STATIC MARKET ANALYSIS
In this section we derive and analyze perfectly competitive
SC market equilibria. We assume perfect competition amongst
SCs due to their lack of economic power in influencing
other SCs based on their quantity of VM availability. Since
prices in perfect competition are strategic complements (in the
terminology of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer [25]), i.e.,
the decrease in an SC’s customer price results in the decrease
of customer prices charged by other SCs in competition, we
are going to eventually converge to a stage where a single
uniform customer price will prevail in the SC market [25].
We are interested to know whether such a price results in
social welfare optimality. In this regard, we (a) formulate and
solve an optimization problem for a regulator who wishes
to achieve socially optimal market equilibria that maximizes
utilitarian social welfare amongst the market stakeholders, (b)
characterize market equilibria in the absence of a regulator
and draw comparative relationships between the equilibria
obtained, with socially optimal market equilibria.
Optimization Problem Formulation - Here, we formulate
a regulator’s optimization problem so as to achieve socially
optimal market equilibria. The primary goal of the formulation
is to maximize the net utilities for the SC customers, and
minimize the net cost of operation of SCs to reach a net
maximum social welfare situation amongst the SCs and their
customers. We define this problem mathematically as follows:
OPT: maxSW
subject to∑
j∈Ci
vmagj − (vmri + vmbi + vmpci ) = 0, ∀i ∈ SC,
where the objective function is to maximize social welfare
SW (see Equation 9 above) or equivalently to minimize the
negative of social welfare (to have a convex objective function
to fit the convex programming paradigm), and the constraint
is the supply-demand balance equation, with
∑
j∈Ci vm
ag
j
representing total customer demand, and (vmri +vm
b
i +vm
pc
i )
representing total SC i supply. Ci is the set of customers
served by SC i. A potential solution to the above optimization
problem indicates the parameters at which the SC market can
ideally operate and (i) make all stakeholders satisfied to a point
that no one has an incentive to deviate, and (ii) maximize the
total satisfaction of all the stakeholders together. We denote
such an ideal state of market operation as a static socially
efficient market equilibrium.
Dual Problem Formulation - We will solve OPT using the
primal-dual approach [26]. The advantage of using the primal-
dual approach is that the dual optimization problem of the
primal is always convex [26], and its solution results in global
optima which can be related back to the optimal solution
of the primal problem. Before deriving the dual optimization
problem, we first define the Lagrangian function of OPT as
follows:
L =
∑
i∈SC
(
c(vmri ) + c(vm
b
i ) + c(vm
pc
i )
)−∑
j∈C
Uj(vm
ag
j )
+
∑
i∈SC
ρi
∑
j∈Ci
vmagj − ρi(vmri + vmbi + vmpci
 ,
where ρ = (ρ1, ...., ρn) is the vector of Lagrange multipliers
for the constraint in OPT. The dual optimization problem,
DOPT, is then defined as follows.
DOPT: max inf
{vme,vmc,vms,vmr,vmb,vmpc,ρ}
L,
where vme, vmc, and vms are vectors of customer VM
types and vmr, vmb, and vmpc are vectors of SC VM
types. Note that vmagi for any customer i equals vm
e
i +
vmci + vm
s
i . Thus, the goal here is to find an optimal
{vme, vmc, vms, vmr, vmb, vmpc, ρ} tuple that is an optimal
solution to both OPT and its dual.
Solving the Dual The dual optimization problem is convex
and its optimal solution is found by applying the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions [26] that are stated through equations
(10a)-(10g). Solving these equations, we obtain the optimal
solution to DOPT. Since OPT is convex, applying Slater’s
conditions we obtain strong duality, i.e., a duality gap of zero
[26], which implies that the optimal solution to OPT coincides
with that of DOPT, and there is no loss in the value of the
optimal solution by the transformation of the primal problem
to its dual. The optimal solution to OPT/DOPT is unique,
and is the static market equilibrium. We denote this solution
by the tuple {vme∗, vmc∗, vms∗, vmr∗, vmb∗, vmpc∗, ρ∗}. We
now state the KKT conditions in the form of equations (10a)-
(10e) as follows.
d(c(vmri ))
dvmri
|vmr∗i − ρ∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ SC. (10a)
d(c(vmbi ))
dvmbi
|vmb∗i − ρ∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ SC. (10b)
d(c(vmpci ))
dvmpci
|vmpc∗i − ρ∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ SC. (10c)
ρ∗i −
∂(Ui(vm
e
i ))
∂vmei
|vme∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ C. (10d)
ρ∗i −
∂(Ui(vm
c
i ))
∂vmci
|vmc∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ C. (10e)
ρ∗i −
∂(Ui(vm
s
i ))
∂vmsi
|vms∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ C. (10f)∑
j∈Ci
vmagj (1− κ1j − κ2j ) = (vmri + vmbi + vmpci ), ∀i ∈ SC.
(10g)
Equilibrium in Distributed Autonomous Settings - The
solution to OPT is unique due to the convexity of the dual
formulation. The key question is whether this solution can be
realized as a market equilibria in a distributed autonomous
setting. Based on the general equilibrium theory in microe-
conomics [17], market equilibria in a perfectly competitive
autonomous setting of firms is known as Walrasian equilibria.
It turns out from general equilibrium results in [17] that
the unique optimal solution to OPT (i) is a competitive
Walrasian equilibrium that is Pareto efficient, (ii) satisfies
Arrow-Debreu’s first and second fundamental theorems of
welfare economics that establishes the if and only if relation
between the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium and its Pareto
efficiency [17], (iii) maximizes utilitarian social welfare (again
derived from Arrow-Debreu’s first and second fundamental
theorems), and (iv) clears the market by balancing total SC
resource supply with consumer and SC resource demand.
Thus, in view of points (i) - (iv), a regulator’s social welfare
maximization objective coincides with the welfare state ob-
tained at market equilibrium in a distributed autonomous firm
setting. We consider this unique equilibrium state to be the
benchmark at which the SC market would be willing to always
operate. However, in practice, for a perfectly competitive
market with non-utilitarian social welfare functions, there may
be multiple Pareto efficient Walrasian market equilbria that are
not socially efficient.
Computing the Socially Optimal Market Equilibrium The
optimal solution to the dual optimization problem, DOPT, can
be obtained in an iterative manner using a gradient approach,
the principle behind which is the Primal-Dual Interior Point
Method [26]. We adopt the Primal-Dual Interior Point method
in our work because it has a polynomial-time complexity to
arrive at the optimal solution to convex programs [27]. The
basis of the method is to progressively change the argument
vector of DOPT so that minima-Lagrange multiplier ρ satisifes
the KKT conditions.
Denote by v, DOPT’s argument vector sans the Lagrange
multiplier ρ, {vme, vmc, vms, vmr, vmb, vmpc}. Applying
the Interior Point method to DOPT gives us the the following
equations:
v(t+ ) = v(t)− kv∇xL · . (11a)
ρ(t+ ) = ρ(t) + kρ∇xL · . (11b)
Here, kv and kρ are positive scaling parameters which control
the amount of change in the direction of the gradient. Letting
→ 0, we get
τv v˙(t) = −∇vL, (12a)
τvρ˙(t) = −∇ρL, (12b)
where τy = 1ky for y = v, ρ. The Interior Point Method
converges in polynomial time when the duality gap approaches
zero, due to the linear and super-linear convergence rate of the
method [26].
IV. DYNAMIC SC MARKETS
On Dynamic SC Markets - In practice, an SC market can be
dynamic in nature due to the non-static nature of the supply
of SC resources and variability of over time of customer
demand. This dynamic nature of the SC market is likely
to lead to frequent static market equilibrium perturbations,
which in turn might (not always) lead to a state of market
disequilibrium. Here, the term ‘disequilibrium’ refers to a
state when market supply does not equal market demand
due to perturbations in market parameters (e.g., customer
prices), and as a result all stakeholders do not mutually satisfy
their interests. In such a case, an important challenge is
to design a stable market that is robust to perturbations
and always returns to its equilibrium point(s) when market
disequilibrium results. Inspired by the notion of disequilibrium
process [3], we propose a dynamic market mechanism for
SCs. The concept of disequilibrium pertains to a situation
where a static market equilibrium is perturbed, potentially to a
disequilibrium state, and the underlying players (stakeholders)
work together to re-attain the equilibrium. The main idea
behind the disequilibrium process is an iterative sequence of
action and state profiles (see below), i.e., information exchange
between the dominant market stakeholders, of VM instance
supply and demand levels, and per-unit VM instance prices, to
arrive at a desired static equilibrium. Such an iterative process
essentially implies an overall dynamic model with feedback.
Our proposed dynamic market mechanism can also be used to
re-attain a specific preferred equilibrium point from a given
equilibrium point. We first present our dynamic market model
and then follow it up with its stability analysis.
A. Dynamic Model
Our dynamic model of SC markets consist of a state space,
X ⊂ Rn, where each state, {ρi} ∈ X , is the profile of per-unit
VM instance prices at each SC i. The state dependent payoff,
i.e., profit function for each SC from its reserved resources is
given by
piri = ρivm
r
i − c(vmri ).
The state dependent payoff for each SC from its borrowed
resources is given by
pibi = ρivm
b
i − c(vmbi ).
Similarly, state dependent payoff for each SC from resources
borrowed from a public cloud is given by
pipci = ρivm
pc
i − c(vmpci ).
The payoff function for the SC customers for a given job type
∈ {e, c, s}, is given by
Uj(vm
type
j )− ρjvmtypej .
Each SC is assigned a state dependent action that permits
the SCs and their customers to change their VM instance
generation and consumption levels respectively. We assume
a perfect competition [19] of VM instance prices amongst the
SCs in competition, and following that the action for each SC
i consists of commiting a certain amount of VM instances
that influences the market-clearing process. In this paper, we
use the gradient play technique in game theory [18] to derive
the state dependent actions of the SCs and their customers.
Our use of the gradient play technique is motivated by the
fact that in many practical market environments stakeholders
(i) find it behaviorally difficult or computationally expensive
to play their best responses [19], (ii) have zero or incomplete
knowledge of the utilities of other stakeholders in the market,
and (iii) cannot even observe the actions of other stakeholders
in the worst case. In such environments, gradient play is a
suitable technique to achieve static market equilibrium stability
iteratively [20]. More specifically, for our market setting the
occurrence of (i)-(iii) is quite likely. Gradient play also works
when issues (i)-(iii) do not arise. The main idea behind the
gradient play technique is the use of ordinary differential
equations (ODEs) to describe the path of a perturbed system
state to the static market equilibrium state. Using gradient
play, the action for the the ith SC is given by
τ ri ˙vm
r
i = ρi − βri vmri − αri . (13a)
τ bi
˙vmbi = ρi − βbi vmbi − αbi . (13b)
τpci
˙vmpci = ρi − βpci vmpci − αpci . (13c)
Here, the parameters τ ri , τ
b
i , and τ
pc
i are time constants that
describe the speed with which the action of VM instance
commitment by SC i can be adjusted, and are free parameters
to be determined. The goal of SC i’s action is to drive the
solution vmri , vm
b
i , and vm
pc
i to vm
r∗
i , vm
b∗
i , and vm
pc∗
i , the
solution to Equations 10(a)-10(c) at static market equilibrium.
It can be seen that the RHSs of 10(a)-10(c) are proportional
to the gradient ∇vmriL, ∇vmbiL, and ∇vmpci L respectively,
where L is the Lagrangian of OPT. The suite of equations
10(a)-10(c) can be solved independently by SC i. In a similar
fashion, using gradient play, the state dependent action for any
SC customer i ∈ C is given by
τagi
˙vmagi = β
ag
i vm
ag
i + α
ag
i − ρi. (14)
τagi is a free parameter to be determined that denotes the speed
with which the consumption action of SC customer i can be
adjusted. The goal of the SC customer action here is to drive
the solution vmagi to vm
ag∗
i , the solution to Equation 10(d) at
static market equilibrium. It can be seen that the RHS of 15 is
proportional to the gradient ∇vmagi L, i ∈ C, where L is the
Lagrangian of OPT. Equation 15 can be solved independently
by each SC customer i.
The dynamics of the pricing mechanism can be expressed
via the following equation.
τρi ρ˙i =
∑
j∈Ci
vmagj (1−κ1j−κ2j )−(vmri +vmbi+vmpci ), (15)
where the goal is to drive the solution ρi, ∀i ∈ SC to ρ∗i ,
the solution of 10(e) at static market equilibrium. Here, τρi
is the free parameter denoting the speed with which ρi can
be adjusted. Equations 13-15 represent a dynamic model of
the overall SC market. It resembles a repeated negotiation
process where SC i responds with a commitment of vmxi ,
x ∈ {r, b, pc} to suggested prices ρi received from the
regulator; SC customer i responds with a consumption amount
of vmtypej , type ∈ {e, c, s}, to the same prices. The regulator
in turn adjusts its prices to these actions by the SCs and
their customers, and returns new prices, {ρi}, and the process
continues till convergence to the static market equilibrium.
A compact representation of the above-mentioned dynamic
SC market is presented in Section 2 of the Appendix. This
representation paves the way for analytically analyzing the
stability of such markets.
1) A Compact Representation: We need to compactly rep-
resent the above dynamic SC market model to pave the way
for analytically analyzing the stability of such markets via
the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion that is based on the theory of
Lyapunov stability (see Section IV.B). Using Equations 13-15,
our proposed dynamic market mechanism can be compactly
represented in the matrix form via the following equation:[
x˙1(t)
x˙2(t)
]
=
[
A1 + ∆A1 A2
0 0
] [
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
+
[
α¯
f2(x1x2).
]
(16)
Definiton of Equation Parameters. We now describe the pa-
rameters of Equation 16. We have
x1(t) = [VM
r
SC VM
b
SC VM
pc
SC VM
e
C VM
c
C VM
s
C ∆ ρ]
T
that is a vector of dimension (|SC| + |C| + 2|SC| − 1) × 1.
Here, |SC| = n. We also have
x2(t) = [0]n−1×1,
and
A1 =
−M1 0 0 M20 M3 0 −M40 0 0 −M5
−M6 M7 M8 0

,
A2 = [0 0 −M9 0].
We define matrices M1 to M9 as follows: M1 =
Diag( 1
τtypei
βtypei ), type∈ {r, b, pc}. We assume that all
for a given type, τ typei ’s are equal for all i ∈ SC.
M2 = Diag(
1
τtypei
ATSC), type∈ {r, b, pc}, where ASC =
Diag(1). M3 = Diag( 1τtypei
βtypei ), type∈ {e, c, s}. M4 =
Diag( 1
τtypei
ATC), type∈ {e, c, s}, where AC = Diag(1).
M5 = Diag(A
′TBA), where A′ is an (n) × (n − 1) matrix
of 1’s except for the 0 diagonal elements, B is an n × n
matrix with all entries 1 except for entries of the form Bii
that take a value of zero, and A is an n×n−1 matrix. M6 =
Diag( 1
τtypeρi
ASC), type∈ {r, b, pc}. M7 = Diag( 1τtypeρi AC),
type∈ {e, c, s}. M8 = Diag( 1τtypeρi A
TBA′), where A is an
(n− 1)× n matrix. M9 = [1]n×n.
The expression f2(x1, x2) is a projection function onto the
non-negative orthant, and is given by
f2(x1, x2) = [cx1 − VMmax]+x2 , (17)
where c = BA′R, R being a rotating matrix. of dimensionality
((|SC| − 1) × |SC| + |C| + 2|SC| − 1) × 1, and VMmax
denotes a vector of maximum VM instances committed by
each individual SC. The nth row of the projection [cx1 −
VMmax]+x2 is denoted as[
[cx1 − VMmax]+x2
]
n
=
{
max(0, [cx1]n − VMmaxn , if [x2]n = 0
[cx1]n − VMmaxn , if[x2]n > 0
(18)
∆A1 in Equation 16 represents the resource availability
perturbations due to dynamics of the SC market caused by
factors stated in Section IV.A. The value lies in a perturbation
set E, where E is given by
E = {∆A = ∆SC −∆C |∆SC ∈ ESC ; ∆C ∈ EC .} (19)
Here,
∆SC =
M10 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0
M11 0 0 0
 ,
where matrix M10 is given by Diag
(
1
τtypei
βtypei (∆SC)
2
)
,
type∈ {r, b, pc}, and ∆SC = Diag(∆typeSC ). Matrix M11 is
given by Diag
(
1
τ
type
ρi
ATSC(I −∆typeSC )
)
, and ASC = Diag(1).
We also have ESC expressed via the following:
ESC = {∆SC |||∆SC || =
√
λmax(∆TSC∆SC) ≤ piSC},
where piSC is a finite constant. Similar to the expression for
∆SC , we have
∆C =
0 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0
0 M12 0 0
 ,
where the matrix M12 is given by
Diag
(
1
τtypeρi
ATC(I − κ1j − κ2j )
)
. We also have
EC = {∆C |||∆C || =
√
λmax(∆TC∆C) ≤ piC},
where piC is a finite constant. Finally, we express b¯ as
b¯ =
[
Diag(
1
τxi
αtypei ) +Diag(
1
τxi
αxi )∆
type
SC Diag(
1
τyi
αtypei ) 0
]T
,
where x ∈ {r, b, pc}, and y ∈ {e, c, s}. We assume that for
given x, y, the values of αxi and α
y
i are equal for all i.
B. Stability Analysis of Dynamic Markets
In this section, we derive results regarding the stability
of static market equilibria in a dynamic SC market setting.
Specifically, (i) we derive the dynamic market equilibria
obtained through gradient play mechanics and compare it with
the socially efficient static market equilibria, and (ii) study the
region of attraction around dynamic market equilibria to derive
stability connotations.
Case - 1: We first consider stability aspects when κ1j , κ2j
equals zero, i.e., there are no curtailed jobs. In this case, the
equilibria of the dynamic SC market described through Equa-
tions 10a - 10c (via the use of the gradient play technique),
lies in the set
E = {(x1, x2)|A1x1 +A2x2 + α¯ = 0 ∩ f2(x1, x2) = 0}.
Let (x∗1, x
∗
2) be an equilibrium point in set E. We then have the
following theorem stating the relationship between (x∗1, x
∗
2)
and the unique static SC market equilibrium obtained through
Equations 10(a) - 10(e). The proof of the theorem is in the
Appendix.
Theorem 4.1: The equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) is identical to the
unique static market equilibrium obtained from the solution
of OPT.
Theorem Implications. The theorem suggests that in the ab-
sence of curtailed jobs, the equilibrium in a dynamic market
setting is unique, and converges to the static market equi-
librium in which the market existed initially before it was
perturbed. Intuitively, when the SC market is perturbed from
its equilibrium setting, a disequilibrium state might result,
which will get resolved due to our proposed gradient-play
based approach that rolls back the disequilibrium state to
the original socially optimal static equilibrium state. In this
paper, we are able to roll back to the original state in theory
because of our assumptions regarding the nature of utility
functions. In practice, gradient play will guarantee a roll back
of a disequilibrium market state to an equilibrium state not
necessarily the original equilibrium state from which it was
perturbed.
We now investigate the stability of the dynamic market
equilibrium to find the region of attraction around itself. We
introduce a few definitions in this regard. Let y1 = x1 − x∗1,
y2 = x2 − x∗2. Denote by V (y1, y2) a scalar, positive definite
Lyapunov function expressed as
V (y1, y2) = y
T
1 y1 + y
T
2 P2y2, (20)
where P1 and P2 are diagonal matrices. We use Lyapunov
functions from control theory [28] as a standard to prove the
stability of an equilibrium of a system represented via ordinary
differential equations (ODEs), such as the ones arising in our
work in Section IV.A. Let d be expressed as
d =
2λmin(P2)ψminλmin(Q)
β2
, (21)
where λmin(·) denotes the minimum eigenvalue of Q,
β ≥ ||P1A2 +RT [1]n×nP2||2,
where R is a rotating matrix, and ψmin = min(ψi), ψi
being the coefficient of the orthogonal vector wi to express
VMmax as
∑n
i=1 ψiwi. We now have the following theorem
characterizing stability of the dynamic market equilibrium.
The proof of the theorem is in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.2: Let A1 be Hurwitz. Then the equilibrium
(x∗1, x
∗
2) is asymptotically stable for all initial conditions in
Ωcmax = {(y1, y2)||V (y1, y2) ≤ cmax} for cmax > 0,
such that
Ωcmax ( D = {y2 ≥ 0|||y2||2 ≤ d}
.
Theorem Implications. Intuitively, the theorem states that irre-
spective of any initial state the market is in, on being perturbed,
it will always come back to an equilibrium state from a
disequilibrium state. The Hurwitz (not the same as Hurwicz)
nature of matrix A1 is determined from the time constants
in Equations 13-15. Most real systems satisfy the Hurwitz
criterion in that A1 will be a real square matrix constructed
with coefficients of a real polynomial.
Case 2: We now consider stability aspects when κ1j , κ2j does
not equal zero. In this case, the equilibria of the dynamic SC
market described through Equations 13(a) - 13(c), also lies in
the set E. We define y1, y2, and V (y1, y2) as before but define
d∆ as
d∆ = d− d∆SC + d∆C , (22)
where d is the same as in Equation (21), ∆SC and ∆SC
represent the supply demand perturbation matrices, and d∆SC
and d∆C are given by
d∆SC =
4λmin(P2)ψmin||P1||2pii|i ∈ SC
β2
. (23a)
d∆C =
4λmin(P2)ψmin||P1||2pij |j ∈ C
β2
. (23b)
We now have the following theorem characterizing market
stability. The proof of the theorem is in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.3: Let A1 be Hurwitz, and let
piSC − piC < λmin(Q)
2||P1||2 (24)
Then the equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) is asymptotically stable for all
initial conditions in
Ωcmax = {(y1, y2)||V (y1, y2) ≤ cmax} for cmax > 0,
such that Ωcmax ( D = {y2 ≥ 0|||y2||2 ≤ d∆}.
Theorem Implications. Similar to the implications of Theorem
4.2, this theorem states that irrespective of any initial state the
market is in, on being perturbed, it will always come back to
an equilibrium state from a disequilibrium state.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we numerically evaluate our dynamic market
model to investigate (a) static market efficiency and average
stakeholder utility under different Samuelson-Bergson welfare
metrics, and (b) stability behavior of dynamic markets. In the
absence of a theoretical study (not our focus in this paper),
(a) is important to get an approximate idea of the gaps in net
stakeholder utility achieved via different welfare functions. (b)
is important to characterize the speed of convergence of an
SC market to go from a state of disequilibrium to a state
of equilibrium. The first part of this section describes the
evaluation setting, and the second part analyzes the results.
A. Evaluation Setup
As a representative numerical evaluation setting, we con-
sider five SCs and 15 customers (not including other SCs).
Each SC has five customers each and they are tied to the
SCs throughout the entire duration of the experiment. Peer
SCs are assumed to be altruistic w.r.t. VM borrowing. The
market parameters for the SCs and the customers are shown
in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. We simulate a perfect price
competition game between the SCs, and use the tatonnement
process (TP) [29] to converge to a static market equilibrium in
practice for a distributed setting. Tatonnement is a trial-and-
error process similar to the hill climbing approach in local
search theory by which equilibrium is reached in competitive
markets via a distributed fashion. As a measure of static
market efficiency we investigate and compare the utilitarian
SW function values at market equilibrium for utilitarian,
egalitarian, and Rawlsian (see Section II.C for more details)
regulators. Note that the utilitarian SW function reflects the net
stakeholder utility, and out goal is to study the net stakeholder
utility at market equilibrium for regulators with different utility
equitability mindsets. For the parameter values in Tables 1 and
2, we run numerical evaluations for all possible permutations
(instances) of values that are applicable to SCs and their
customers, and report the mean value of the results obtained
(with the exception of Figure 1c which reports (without loss
of generality) on individual permutations). Note that each
permutation of values can be considered as a different market
setting. To experiment on dynamic markets, as a representative
example, we fix τρ to be the same for all SCs and vary it in the
interval [0, 5]. Similarly we fix τag to be the same for all 15
customers and vary it in the interval [.05, .2]. We also make
κ1 and κ2 to be equal for all customers and vary it in the
interval [0, 0.05]. To provide a rationale behind the values for
the time constant, τρ, first note that it represents the market
time scale for the update of prices. Small values of τρ implies
a fast update in real-time price, which can introduce volatility.
On the other hand, high values of τρ contributes to reduced
volatility. The time constant, τag , represents the reciprocal of
consumer demand elasticity.
B. Analysis of Evaluation Results
In the first part of this section, we analyze SC cost and
customer utility allocations at market equilibrium under the
utilitarian, egalitarian, and Rawlsian SW paradigms. In the
second part, we analyze the stability of various dynamic
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF COST FUNCTIONS FOR SCS
SC# VMmin VMmax τSC β α
SC1 0 200 0.6 -0.3 90
SC2 0 200 0.2 -0.6 102
SC3 0 250 0.6 -0.25 80
SC4 0 250 0.6 -0.25 80
SC5 0 200 0.2 - 0.01 20
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR CUSTOMERS
Customer(C)# VMmin VMmax τC β α
C1, C2 60 100 0.1 -0.5 168
C3, C4 60 100 0.1 -0.15 140
C5, C6 70 80 0.2 -0.35 140
C7, C8 20 60 0.2 -0.2 100
C9, C10 30 60 0.2 -0.3 120
C11, C12 20 40 0.2 -0.1 125
C13, C14, C15 30 60 0.2 -0.5 135
market settings, and also how fast a dynamic market converges
to a stable equilibrium.
Static Market Equilibrium Performance. Using TP and in
the presence of a regulator with different social welfare (SW)
mindsets, we arrive at a different single market equilibrium
(ME) maximizing SW. Note here that ME might not be unique,
and in this case TP will converge locally to a ME in a
distributed manner. The regulator will then have the option to
work upon the ME to maximize SW. We observe (as a mean
of multiple instances) from Figures 1(a&b) that with respect to
SC and customer allocation ratio equitability, Egalitarian MEs
are the best as they ensure nearly identical cost and utility
allocation ratios across all autonomous SCs and customers
respectively, followed closely by Rawlsian MEs, and utilitarian
MEs that are not very fair (equitable) in the utility allocation
sense. Here, we define allocation ratio as the ratio of the cost
(utility) of SC (customer) i to the maximum cost (utility) of
any SC (customer) at ME, for each given market type. On
the other hand, we see that market equilibrium in utilitarian
markets, MEs lead to a considerably greater additive stake-
holder satisfaction (utility) (see Figure 1c.) when compared
to egalitarian and Rawlsian markets., i.e., the utilitarian SW
metric is highest in utilitarian markets. This is true from theory
as marginal stakeholder utility at utilitarian ME is equal across
all stakeholders. In addition, from theory, SW maximizing ME
in utilitarian competitive markets are always Pareto optimal. In
Figure 1c, U−SWOPT,t, t ∈ {U,E,R}, denotes the utilitarian
social welfare value at the optimal market situation of type t,
and U−SWOPT,tU−SWOPT,U is the ratio of the utilitarian social welfare
value at the optimal market situation of type t to the optimal
utilitarian social welfare at utilitarian ME.
Dynamic Market Stability Performance. Through Figures
2, 3, and 4, we study dynamic markets for three different
instances of (κ1, κ2) pairs, for utilitarian, Rawlsian, and egal-
itarian market types. For each instance, and for any market
type, we observe that low values of τρ for a given instance
correspond to market instability, i.e., a state of disequilibrium,
because they imply a fast update in SC prices charged to
customers, indicating market volatility in supply and demand
as well. Here, stability is indicated through the maximum of
the eigenvalues of Hurwitz matrix A1 (see Section III) formed
from the market instance, which are negative in the stable
zone, and positive in the unstable zone. It is logical to expect
that market instability can be reduced if the price update is
slower, i.e., if τρ is larger. In this regard, we observe that
the reduction in market instability takes place the slowest for
egalitarian market types because in such markets there is a
strict requirement of absolute stakeholder utilities to be equal
at ME. The reduction in market instability is the fastest for
utilitarian market types. We also observe from figures 2-4
that market volatility is increased due to a decrease in τag
values because the latter trend corresponds to the increase in
demand elasticity which contributes to a market being volatile.
We infer from the plots that it is possible to design an SC
market where volatility (arising due to either low τρ or low
τag values) can be contained by increasing market latency, i.e.,
increasing τρ values. With respect to the speed of convergence,
from Figures 2-4, we observe in general that SC markets
converge fast to the stable zone, i,e., even at low values of
τrho, but the speed of convergence increases with increasing
κ1, κ2 values. This is because increasing κ values indicate
more demand curtailment by SC customers, potentially leading
to non-volatility in supply and prices.
VI. RELATED WORK
We give an overview of efforts related to ours and highlight
the relevant differences. Works on hybrid clouds [30], [31]
are related as they allow private (or smaller-scale) clouds
to outsource their requests to large-scale public providers.
However, since that can potentially be costly for a small-
scale provider, our work differs in that it focuses on a sharing
framework, while minimizing cost of using public clouds.
Earlier efforts also study the competition and cooperation
within a federated cloud. For instance, authors in [32], [33]
characterize the cloud federation to help cloud providers
maximize their profits via dynamic pricing models. Earlier
efforts [34]–[37] also study the competition and cooperation
among cloud providers, but assume that each cloud provider
has sufficient resources to serve all users’ requests, while [35]
incorporates a penalty function to address the service delay
penalty. Authors in [38] propose a hierarchical cooperative
game theoretic model for better resources integration and
achieving a higher profit in the federation. Similarly to our
work, [39] studies a federation formation game but assumes
that cloud providers share everything with others, while [40]
adopts cooperative game theoretic approaches to model a cloud
federation and study the motivation for cloud providers to
participate in a federation.
Another line of work focuses on designing sharing policies
in the federation to obtain higher profit. For instance, [41]
proposes a decentralized cloud platform SpotCloud [42], a
real-world system allowing customers or SCs to sell idle
compute resources at specified prices, and presents a resource
pricing scheme (resulting from a repeated seller game) plus
an optimal resource provisioning algorithm. [43] employs
various cooperation strategies under varying workloads, to
reduce the request rejection rate (i.e., the efficiency metric
in [43]). Another effort [44] combines resource outsourcing
and rejection of less profitable requests in order to increase
resource utilization and profit. [45] proposes to efficiently
deploy distributed applications on federated clouds by consid-
ering security requirements, the cost of computing power, data
storage and inter-cloud communication. [46] groups resources
of various SCs into computational units, in order to serve
customers’ requests. [47] proposes to incorporate both histor-
ical and expected future revenue into VM sharing decisions in
order to maximize an SC’s profit.
Differences and Drawbacks. Our work is a necessarily
important theoretical extension of a very recent analytical
work in [2] that was the first of its kind in the analysis of
small cloud markets. There, the authors considered conse-
quences of performance (i.e., queueing theory) driven non-
cooperative game-theoretic (with no SC willing to share its
utility and capacity information with others, i.e., an incom-
plete information game-theoretic setting) resource sharing on
the resulting performance delivered to customers at static
market equilibrium, something not considered by any of the
above-mentioned efforts. However, [2] does not consider the
important problem of analyzing equilibrium stability under
variations in SC resource availability, in a non-cooperative
game-theoretic SC environment. Without showing the existence
of a stable SC market, one, based on the existing results
showing the existence of a market equilibrium, cannot not
say much regarding the sustainability of SC markets in the
future. A characterization of this scenario is an important
contribution of this work. A major difference of our work with
the one in [2], is the lack of a queuing-driven performance
model to reduce the equilibrium search space. However, our
work is orthogonal in the sense that, given the existence of
(efficient) market equilibria, we investigate whether such a
state is sustainable in the long run.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we addressed the problem of effective re-
source sharing between small clouds (SCs). We modeled the
problem as an efficient supply-demand market design task
consisting of (i) autonomous SCs, (ii) their customers, and
(iii) a regulator, as the market stakeholders. We first showed
that a welfare allocation policy for the stakeholders by the
regulator maximizes utilitarian social welfare at the static
market equilibrium and results in the best/most efficient state
at which the SC markets could operate. Fortunately, courtesy
Arrow-Debreu welfare theorems in welfare economics, this
unique optimal operating point is also achieved in a distributed
manner by the autonomous SCs in perfect price competition
with one another, thereby guaranteeing no efficiency loss in a
non-centralized market setting. However, the optimal market
equilibrium point is prone to perturbations due to the dynamic
nature of the SC market, thereby potentially leading to market
disequilibrium. In this context, we designed a dynamic market
Fig. 1. ME Performance (a) SC Costs (left), (b) Customer Utilities (middle), (c) Social Welfare Ratio (right) w.r.t to various SW metrics
Fig. 2. Market Stability Performance when (a) κ1 = κ2 = 0 (left), (b) κ1 = κ2 = 0.02 (middle), (c) κ1 = κ2 = 0.05 (right) [Utilitarian]
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Fig. 3. Market Stability Performance when (a) κ1 = κ2 = 0 (left), (b) κ1 = κ2 = 0.02 (middle), (c) κ1 = κ2 = 0.05 (right)[Rawlsian]
mechanism based on Arrow and Hurwicz’s disequilibrium
process that uses the gradient play technique in game theory to
converge upon the optimal static market efficient equilibrium
from a disequilibrium state caused due to supply-demand
perturbations, and results in market stability. We illustrated
the stability and sustainability of dynamic SC markets and
the high speed with which such markets converge to stable
equilibria, through numerical experiments.
A comment on Heterogenous VMs - In out work, we have mod-
eled a homogenous VM case. In practice, each cloud provider
offers heterogeneous VM profiles (e.g., memory-optimized,
CPU-optimized, or GPU-enabled), which reserve hardware
resources on pre-specified machine pools shared by multiple
VMs [48]. However, many cloud providers, such as Amazon
LightSail, DigitalOcean, and Linode, offer VM configurations
with very similar specifications (e.g., $10/month instances
from Linode, DigitalOcean, and Amazon Lightsail currently
provide 1 CPU core, 30 GB SSD, 2 TB data transfer/month,
1 or 2 GB of RAM). We believe that it is very likely that
SCs would negotiate the sharing policies for each VM profile
separately, given that these profiles correspond to different
prices and capacities at each SC. In this case, our model of
homogeneous resources can be applied repeatedly to each VM
profile. Sharing policies for hardware resources (rather than
VM profiles) would require the introduction of scheduling and
packing algorithms within our performance model, which is
beyond the scope of this work.
As part of future work, we plan to design provably fast
distributed algorithms to allow markets to roll back to efficient
equilibria when perturbed from an equilibrium state, and
study dynamic SC markets under (i) a setting of imperfect
competition between SCs, and (ii) a coalitional market setting
where SCs have the capability to collude with one another.
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VIII. APPENDIX
In this section, we provide the proofs for Theorems 4.1-4.3.
Theorem Proofs. We now state the theorem proofs below.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) when set-
ting κ1j , κ
2
j to zero, is a solution of the following.
ρ∗i − βri vmr∗i − αri = 0, ∀i ∈ SDC. (25a)
ρ∗i − βbi vmb∗i − αbi = 0, ∀i ∈ SDC. (25b)
ρ∗i − βpci vmpc∗i − αpci = 0, ∀i ∈ SDC. (25c)
βtypei vm
type
i + α
type
i − ρ∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ C, type ∈ {e, c, s, ag}.
(25d)∑
j∈Ci
vmagj (1− κ1j − κ2j ) = (vmri + vmbi + vmpci ), ∀i ∈ SDC.
(25e)
Using Theorem 3 in [49], strong duality implies that
equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2 exists is identical to the solution of the
KKT conditions in (10a)-(10e). It can be seen that (25a)
follows by replacing the cost function for SDCs in (2)-(4)
in (10a). Similarly, (25b) follows by replacing the utility
function of SDC customers in (5)-(8) in (10d). Furthermore
(25c) is identical to (10e). Thus, (x∗1, x
∗
2 is identical to the
equilibrium in (10a)-(10e). Thus, we proved Theorem 4.1. .
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Since strong duality holds, it follows
from Theorem 4.1 that equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2 ∈ E exists. We
first prove the stability of this equilibrium point and then
proceed to its asymptotic stability. Differentiating the positive
definite Lyapunov function V (y1, y2) = yT1 P1y1 + y
T
2 P2y2,
with respect to time where y1 = x1 − x∗1 and y2 = x2 − x∗2,
and by using the non-expansive property of the projection
operation, we have
¯V (y1, y2) ≤ yT1 (P1A1 +AT1 P1)y1 +yT1 P1A2y2 +y2AT2 P1y1 (26)
If A1 is Hurwitz, for any Q > 0, there exists a positive
definite matrix P1 such that P1A1+AT1 P1 = −Q. Let λmin(Q)
denote the minimum eigenvalue of Q. Since P2 is a symmetric
positive definite matrix with a set n orthogonal, real, and non-
zero eigenvectors x1, ...., xn, can be written as
P2 =
n∑
i=1
λixix
T
i ,
where λi > 0 is the eigenvalue corresponding to xi. We can
expand the vector VMmax using the orthogonal vector wi as
VMmax
T
[1]n×nP2y2 ≥ λmin(P2)ψmin||y2||2, (27)
where ψmin = min(ψi),∀i = 1, ..., n. Now let
β ≥ ||P1A2 +RT [1]n×nP2||2.
Using (26) and (27), we obtain
¯V (y1, y2) ≤ −λ(Q)
(
||y1||2 − β
λmin(Q)
||y2||2
)2
− ||y2||
(
2λmin(P2ψmin − β
2
λmin(Q)
||y2||
)
.
For all Ωmax ( D, it follows that for all solutions beginning
in Ωmax, V ≤ 0. Hence, the equilibrium is stable and Ωmax
is the region of attraction.
Since the initial conditions start in Ω∆ and the
latter is a strict subset of D∆, y2 cannot be equal
to 2λmin(P2)ψmin
λmin(Q)
β2 . This in turn implies that
(||y1||, ||y2|| = (0, 0) is the only invariant set. Hence,
all solutions starting in Ω∆ converge to the equilibrium point
(x1, x2) = (x
∗
1, x
∗
2). Thus, we proved Theorem 4.2. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Differentiating the Lyapunov function
V (y1, y2) along the trajectories of (16), we get
¯V (y1, y2) ≤ −a∆
(
||y1|| − β
a∆
||y2||
)2
− ||y2||
(
e− β
2
a∆
||y2||
)
,
(28)
where a∆ = λmin(Q) − 2||P1||piSDC + 2||P1||piC , and e =
2λmin(P2)ψmin.
From (24) it follows that a∆ > 0. Therefore, (25) implies
that for all Ωcmax ( D∆, for all solutions beginning in Ω∆,
V¯ ≤ 0. Hence, the market equilibrium state is stable, and Ω∆
is the region of attraction.
The asymptotic stability of the perturbed market can be
shown via the following argument: since the initial conditions
start in Ω∆ and the latter is a strict subset of D∆, y2 cannot
be equal to 2λmin(P2)ψmin
λmin(Q)
β2 . This in turn implies that
(||y1||, ||y2|| = (0, 0) is the only invariant set. Hence, all
solutions starting in Ω∆ converge to the equilibrium point
(x1, x2) = (x
∗
1, x
∗
2). Thus, we have proved Theorem 4.3. 
